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I. INTRODUCTION
Threat detection in cyberspace is an arms race between
adversaries and defenders. In this arms race, attackers can
always bypass existing detection mechanisms by discovering
new attack surfaces, while defenders are tired of plugging
various vulnerabilities.
Therefore, security researchers and practitioners should re-
think traditional mitigating techniques and try to design more
robust detection mechanisms that are capable of representing
various attacks, especially the previously unseen ones. The
Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has
launched a four-year project called Transparent Computing
since 2015 [1], trying to find a high-fidelity and visible method
to abstract the interaction between components in the opaque
system. The researchers found that the provenance graph may
be an ideal tool, with strong abstract expression ability and
relatively high efficiency.
Now more and more research work [2]–[8] began to focus
on detection and response algorithms based on provenance
graphs and believe that provenance graph has the potential
to become the next generation of more robust detection
mechanisms. As shown in the Figure 1, the provenance graph
represents the relationship between the control flow and data
flow between the subject (such as processes, threads, etc.)
and the object (such as files, registry, network sockets) in the
system through a directed graph with timing. The provenance
graph can link causal events in the system, regardless of the
time between the two events. All in all, utilizing provenance
graphs for threat detection and investigation has the following
advantages:
• Provenance graphs altogether show system execution by
representing them as interactions between system objects.
Such dependency is innate for all the execution trace.
Unstructured log like Auditd [9] can also be transformed
into provenance graph [10].
• Provenance graphs enable semantic-aware and robust de-
tection. Compared to unstructured audit logs, provenance
graphs with spatial and temporal information are more
difficult to forge by attackers [11]. Moreover, provenance
graphs provide richer semantic; thus security analysts can
conduct more effective and throughput attack investigation.
• Provenance graphs keep all the execution history. Ad-
vanced persistent threat (APT) attacks [12] are long-
running and stealthy attacks. To investigate such attacks,
analysts need to access and understand the whole attack
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Fig. 1. A provenance graph sample
history. Actually, system execution history is necessary for
any intrusion to trace the entry point and understand the
impact.
A. The Scope of this survey
Data provenance, also called data lineage, was initially
introduce to find the origin of data in databases [13], [14].
In the subsequence researches, data provenance are widely
adopted for multiple different purposes, such as reproducibility
[15], [16], fault injection [17], and so on. Several surveys are
also be done for different provenance applications [18]–[21].
Differences with the above work, this paper focus on
threat detection and investigation with system-level prove-
nance graphs.
B. The Definition of System-level Provenance Graph
System-level provenance graphs treat all system-level enti-
ties as vertexes and all operation between entities as edges.
The operations are collected by auditing tools and generate
events stream with timestamps. The order of events affect
semantics, and events are directed, which indicate the flow of
data or control. Thus, provenance graphs have strong spatial
and temporal properties. Such properties are called causality
for provenance graphs. Correspondingly, provenance graphs
are also called causality graphs. A series of basic definition
related are given as follows:
DEFINITION 1. Subjects and Objects. Subject refer to the
entity in the system that perform a operation to another entity
ar
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Fig. 2. A general framework of provenance-based threat detection system
that is called object. Subject and objects are denoted by u and
v respectively.
It is worth mentioning that subjects and objects are relative,
a subject of one operation can be the object of another event.
Subjects can be processes, threads, etc. Moreover, Objects can
be files, sockets, and so on. For different operation systems,
the types of subject and object could be different. For example,
Windows have unique registry objects and COM objects.
However, it is not complicated to extend the provenance graph
with more types of subjects and objects.
DEFINITION 2. Events refer to the operations between en-
tities in the system. An event includes four main attributes: the
subject performing the operation, the object being operated,
the time when the event occurred, and the specific content
of the operation. Thus, a event can be denoted by a quad
< subject, object, time, operation > (or < u, v, t, o > for
short.) Table I lists the most commonly used events. And it is
relatively easy for analysts to add more events.
DEFINITION 3. Provenance Graph is the collection of
all subjects, objects and events and can be denoted by G =
(S,O,E), where S represent the collection of subjects, O
represent the collection of objects, E represent the collection
of events.
In provenance graphs, both subjects and objects are rep-
resented as nodes, while events are represented as edges.
There could be more than one edges between two nodes with
different time or operation.
DEFINITION 4. Causality Dependency. Two events e1 =
(u1, v1, t1) and e2 = (u2, v2, t2) have causality dependency,
if v1 = u2 ∧ t1 < t2.
Causality dependencies indicate the possible data and con-
trol flow between two events. However, two events are causal-
ity dependent does not necessarily mean there are data or
control flow between them. Thus, compared to taint analysis
[22], the causality-based analysis will introduce more false
dependencies and cause more severe explosion problems.
DEFINITION 5. Backward Tracking. Starting from a
single detection point (e.g. a suspicious file), the backward
tracking process tries to find all nodes in the provenance graph
that causally affect the detection point.
DEFINITION 6. Forward Tracking. Starting from a single
detection point, the forward tracking process tries to find all
nodes in the provenance graph that causally depend on the
TABLE I
COMMON PROVENANCE EVENTS LIST
Sample graph Description
Process File Write File
ProcessFile Read File
Process Connection Send Data
ProcessConnection Receive Data
Parent 
Process
Child
Process Create New Process
Process Process
Inter-process
communication
detection point.
The backward and forward tracking is widely used together
in attack investigation to find the entry point and analysis the
impact of the attack.
C. The Typical Design of Provenance Graph-based Detec-
tion System
In this section, we will introduce the composition of a
typical provenance graph-based detection system. As Figure
2 shows, firstly, data collection modules should be installed
in the target hosts to collect operation between system ob-
jects, which indicate provenance information. Coarse-grain
provenance (§II-A) information can be obtained with built-in
auditing systems for most of today’s operation systems, such
as ETW [23] (Event Tracing for Windows) and Linux auditing
system [9]. However, to collect more fine-grained provenance
(§II-B), analyzer needs to install extra infrastructure, such
as common libraries or hook into system calls. These fine-
grained techniques have much higher overhead, ranging from
2× to 10×, and sometimes require support from vendors. The
collected information will be parsed into a stream of events
defined by Definition 3. The event stream will be transformed
into a data management module or directly to a stream-based
3Backtracking, SOSP'03
Coloring, ICDCS'06
Execution Partition, NDSS'13 MCI, NDSS'18
ProTracer, NDSS'16
LDX, ASPLOS' 16 Lprov, ACSAC' 18
Sleuth, Security' 17
MPI, Security' 17
SPADE, Middelware' 12 Instrumentation-free, ACSAC' 15
Hercule, ACSAC' 16
LogGC, CCS' 13
Causality-preserving, CCS'16
Winnower, NDSS' 18
PrioTracker, NDSS' 18
Fine-grained Provenance Graph Data Collection
NoDoze, NDSS' 19
Holmes, S&P' 19
Poirot, CCS' 19
AIQL, ATC' 18
SAQL, Security' 18
CamQuery, CCS' 18
Tau-Calculus, CCS' 18
NodeMerge, CCS' 18
Dependence-preserving, Security' 18
Realtime Threat Detection
Unicorn, NDSS' 20
OmegaLog, NDSS' 20
ProvDetector, NDSS' 20
Alternat ive Tag, S&P' 20
System-level Provenance Graph Data Collection
Fig. 3. A Brief History of Adopting Provenance Graph in Threat Detection
detection system.
In the data management module, a filter will apply dif-
ferent data reduction algorithm (§III-B) to remove redundant
events according to different principles. Data reduction for
provenance graph can not only reduce storage space but
also reduce subsequent detection or investigation overhead.
The compressed data will be stored in databases, which is
ingeniously designed to support frequent queries (§III-C) and
persistent access (§III-A).
The last and most important module is threat detection mod-
ules (§IV). Intrusion detection based on provenance graphs
is not straight-forward. The most significant challenge comes
from the massive amount of data generated in real-time. A
standard operating system will perform massive file read and
write and network connection operations, which bring a lot
of background noise. According to the survey results in [24],
for a typical bank with 20,000 hosts, about 70PB of logs are
generated annually. How to find out suspicious events timely is
also challenging. One mitigates way for both challenges is to
build a concise yet comprehensive model incrementally with
stream data input.
All in all, to design an ideal provenance graph-based de-
tection and investigation system, we should take the following
four research questions into consideration:
• RQ1: How to reduce the size of the data storage as much
as possible while maintaining the semantics?
• RQ2: How to balance the space efficiency of the prove-
nance graph storage with the time efficiency of the query?
• RQ3: How to design an efficient and robust intrusion
detection algorithm and minimize false positives?
• RQ4: How to shorten the response time of detection and
forensics as much as possible?
D. A Brief History of Adopting Provenance Graph in Threat
Detection
As shown in Figure 3, we studied dozens of research
work and summarized several major technology trends. The
first one is ”the study of fine-grained provenance graph col-
lection”. Original system-level provenance graph is coarse-
grained, exists lots of false dependence, thus leads to the
”dependence explosion” problem. Fine-grained data collection
can fundamentally mitigate this problem, while the overhead
is much higher.
The second trend is ”the study of stream-based detection and
investigation”. Response time is critical to real-world security
investigation. A quick response can effectively avoid the same
attack and reduce the loss. Investigation after building the
complete provenance graph introduces a long delay. Thus,
researchers focus on streaming graph-based detection that can
perform real-time detection and investigation.
E. Contributions
All in all, this survey make the following contribution:
• We present the first throughput survey for threat detection
and investigation with provenance graph.
• We summarize various techniques used in many papers
and give a typical design of system architecture.
• We set up comparison indicators and systematically com-
pared dozens of detection systems. Based on the compari-
son, we give the strategy of technology selection for real-
world deployment.
II. DATA COLLECTION MODULE
As the first step, security analyzers need to deploy collectors
on target hosts to collect provenance information. Generally,
there are two kinds of collectors: The coarse-grained collectors
that focus on system-level information flow, such as file reads,
inter-process communication, and so on; and fine-grained
collectors that involve intra-process information flow tracking.
We will comparatively introduce the design and mechanism of
these two kinds of collectors in §II-A and §II-B.
A. Coarse-grained Provenance Collection
Coarse-grain data collectors only track the provenance be-
tween system-level objects, also called system-level collectors.
The system-level provenance can be obtained from multiple
different sources. Most of today’s operating systems have
built-in audit system, can provide necessary information flow
among system-level objects. There are also third-party collec-
tors, such as FUSE [37]. CamFlow [25] adopts LSM [38] and
NetFilter [39] hook kernel objects’ security data structure on
4TABLE II
COMPARISON OF PROVENANCE DATA COLLECTION APPROACHES
O/H Acc. Granularity OtherRequirements
System-level
[10], [25] Low Low Coarse None
Execution Partition
[8], [26]–[29] Low Mid Mid Instrumentation
Causality Inference
[30]–[32] Mid Mid Mid
Training or
Dual-Exectuion
Taint Analysis
[33]–[35] High High Fine
Tainting
Framework
Multi-layer [36] Low Low Coarse Static Analysis
Linux. Shiqing Ma, et al. proposed [8] that obtain system event
from windows built-in auditing system ETW [23]. SPADE [10]
provide multiple collector modules for different systems, for
example, hooking system call through Auditd [9] on Linux
and MacFUSE [40] on Mac OS, etc.
For different operation system and audit tools, the event
list could be different. For Linux, all objects are abstracted
as files. The Table I give the simplest provenance events list.
For windows, reading and writing to the registry is important.
However, such extension is trivial and will not affect later
data management and detection too much. W3C Prov-DM [41]
provide more specific definition. In practice, security analyzer
should customize the events list to reach a balance between
overhead and functionality.
B. Fine-grained Provenance Collection
One common challenge for causality tracking with prove-
nance graph is the ”Dependence Explosion” problem, which
causes a large number of benign nodes marked as malicious
and bring a lot of computing overhead and human labor.
Specifically, for a provenance node with m input edges and
n output edges, there could be as much as m × n possible
information flows. Fine-grained provenance collectors can
solve the ”Dependence Explosion” problem fundamentally by
associating inputs and outputs more accurately. Ideally, the
number of information flow can be reduce to m + n. Thus,
researchers proposed lots of approaches to collect fine-grained
provenance, as shown in Table II.
Taint analysis that can accurately track information flow
within processes are widely used to prevent information leak or
zero-day attacks [22], [42]–[44]. By combining inter-process
provenance analysis and intra-process analysis, researchers
[33]–[35] are able to accurately track the information flow.
However, taint analysis introduces significant overhead, slow-
ing down programs by 2× to 10× or more.
Excessive overhead makes Taint infeasible for large-scale
threat detection. To reduce the overhead, S. Ma et al. [8] first
proposed execution partition-based approach. They figure out
that taint analysis, which tracking information flow between
variables, is too fine-grain and not necessary to build causality
connection between inputs and outputs. Thus, they try to find
a middle layer between coarse-grain processes and fine-grain
variables, what called unit. Many later works [26]–[29] adopt
the similar idea. All these works make a different assumption
about the causality should be maintained only in what kind
of unit. For example, [8] believe processes can be split into
many main loops, and each loop completes a task. Thus, the
causality relationship will only be built in the loop However,
such assumptions do not always stand, and these approaches
either need extra infrastructure or support from vendors.
Except accurately information flow tracking, causality infer-
ence can also effectively reduce false-positive. Y. Kwon et al.
proposed dual execution-based causality inference [30], [31].
By comparing the the output buffer contents of the master
and slave at the sink(s), they can determine if the sink(s) are
causally dependent on the source(s). Wajih Ul Hassan et al.
proposed Winnower [32] which try to infer the connection by
training a model to succinctly summarize the behavior of many
nodes.
The collected provenance information can be transmit di-
rectly to detection module or through a data management
module first.
III. DATA MANAGEMENT MODULE
Ubiquitously monitoring system in a organization or en-
terprise will generate massive amount of data. An ideal data
management module should consider how to reduce storage
cost while provide effective query interface. In this section, we
shall introduce how to design such a ideal data management
module from three aspects, namely, data storage mechanism
(§III-A), data reduction algorithms (§III-B) and query interface
(§III-C).
A. Data Storage Mechanism
The data storage mechanism is the foundation of the whole
data management module. The data storage mechanism used
depends on subsequent operations. We will systematically
analyze the relationship between different detection algorithms
and their corresponding data storage mechanism in §IV.
A straightforward idea is to store provenance graph with
a graph database. Graph database [45] is a widely used
NoSQL database, which stores all data as nodes and edges and
provide semantic query interfaces with nodes and edges. Thus,
performing graph algorithms, such as backtracking and graph
alignment is relatively easy. However, existing graph database
need to load the whole graph database in the main memory
to enable queries. In a large organization, terabytes of data
needs to be loaded for a long-running attack campaigns. Even
allocating such large memory is possible, such approaches
incurs significant I/O overhead. To mitigate this challenge, the
security researchers design detection algorithms [2], [3], [5],
[46] that consume every event in the stream only once, and
adopt state stored constant cache to represent events’ history.
Corresponding to the cached graph stored in memory, we call
the input of such approaches as streaming graph.
Vertex-centric database, built on relational database, store all
entries as < K,V > pairs, where K is a identifier represent
vertexes (nodes) and V is a list of several entries, such as
parents nodes, child nodes and rules [4]. Such store mechanism
can easily count interaction between nodes, thus widely used
in abnormal analysis-based detection systems. Furthermore,
relational database can be stored in disk and accelerate with
5in-memory cache, and thus more feasible than graph database-
based approaches.
B. Data Reduction Algorithms for Provenance Graphs
In recent years, more organizations, enterprises, and govern-
ment agencies suffered from advanced persistent threat (APT)
attacks [23-25]. These attacks often have multiple phases and
last for quite some time. Moreover, these attacks are often
very covert and difficult to detect. It has been reported that the
average duration of advanced persistent threat attacks lurking
within an enterprise is as long as 188 days [26]. However, the
amount of data collected in the provenance graph is extremely
large, and the amount of data for a single machine can easily
exceed 1GB in one day, and the number of hosts in a large
enterprise or organization can reach tens of thousands, thus
bringing significant data storage overhead. At the same time,
a massive amount of data also brings great difficulties to
subsequent data backtracking. Therefore, the algorithm for
compressing the provenance graph is a subject that researchers
need to study.
The provenance graph is a special graph whose data mainly
includes two parts: nodes (subjects and objects) and edges
(events). The essence of the compression of the provenance
graph is to remove as many unnecessary nodes and edges
as possible while maintaining as much semantics as possible.
Specifically, three questions need to be considered: 1) How to
define the semantics that needs to be maintained? 2) What is
the computational complexity of the compression algorithm?
3) How effective is the compression algorithm? With these
three questions in mind, we discuss how to compress nodes
and edges, respectively.
In this section, we mainly focus on data reduction methods
that refer to some data reduction principle and guarantee
limited semantic loss.
1) Data Reduction for Edges
In a typical operating system, processes and file objects will
exist for a while and generate lots of operations between them.
Thus, the number of edges is much larger than the nodes’ in
most provenance graph, especially for long-running systems.
Data reduction algorithms for edges shall introduce higher data
reduction ration than algorithms for nodes.
Data reduction approaches need to handle the trade-off
between data compression ration and semantic retention. It is
almost impossible to prune data without losing any semantics.
Thus, the researchers should consider how much semantics
should be preserved after data reduction. Causality-preserving
reduction approach [24] and dependency-preserving reduction
approach [47] are proposed to define the lost. A simple and
intuitive definition of causality is that the first write to an
object will affect the subsequent readings.
Causality-preserving Reduction (CPR). As we discussed
in §I, causality analysis is the most commonly used operation
in provenance graph. Zhang Xu et al. proposed causality-
preserving reduction [24] that maintains the ability to causality
analysis on provenance graphs. A simple and intuitive def-
inition of causality is that the first write to an object will
affect the subsequent readings. Thus, to avoid changing the
causality between objects, CPR will only remove any repeated
writes/reads between a pair of objects with no read/write to the
destination object. CPR can completely preserve the topology
of the graph, and ensure that most detection algorithms are still
valid on the compressed graph. However, the algorithm will
lose statistical information, including the access frequency,
etc. In real-world scenarios, analyzers should pick reduction
algorithms according to the subsequent analysis.
Full Dependence-Preserving Reduction (FDR) and
Source Dependence-Preserving Reduction (SDR). As Figure
4 shows, while CPR preserves the semantics in provenance
graphs well, it has limited data reduction ratio. To further
compress the provenance graph, Hossain et al. [47] pro-
posed dependence-preserving data compaction. Dependence-
preserving reduction only considers the basic operation on
provenance graphs, namely, backward tracking and forward
tracking. FDR and SDR rely on global reachability of prove-
nance graphs, which is much more expensive to compute
than CPR. To overcome these computational challenges, they
proposed versioned dependence graphs, which are widely used
to simplify computation produce of provenance [48], [49].
2) Data Reduction for Nodes
Some techniques try compressing provenance logs via web
graph compression algorithm [50] or detecting common sub-
graphs and compressing them [51]. The main problem of these
techniques is that they involve expensive runtime overhead.
However, system-level provenance graphs expand quickly.
Light-weight compression algorithms are required.
Towards designing efficient compression algorithms, Lee et
al. [52] designed garbage collecting for provenance, which can
locate isolated temporary nodes. Removing these nodes will
not affect causality in provenance graphs. Tang et al. proposed
nodemerge [53], which adopt enhanced FP-growth algorithm
to find common access patterns during program initialization.
The compression ratio of both algorithms is lower than edge-
based reduction algorithm.
C. Query Interface
Most detection approaches tend to use naive database query
interfaces and fixed data structure to ensure universality.
However, for customized attack investigation requirement, the
naive query interfaces may not flexible enough. To fill this
research gap, researchers proposed series of provenance graph
query systems [54]–[57].
These query systems provide investigation capabilities that
naive databases cannot provide or require extra effect. These
capabilities are list as following:
Causality Tracking. Provenance graphs have strong spatial
and temporal properties and different from ordinary graphs.
Backward and forward tracking should take these properties,
which are called causality, into consideration. Such tracking
operations are common tasks in forensic for root cause dis-
covery and impact analysis [58]. Almost all the query systems
regard the causality tracking as their basic function and provide
convenient language or interface support [54], [56], [57].
Provenance Graph Pattern Matching. Graph pattern
matching is at the core of graph query. For threat detection
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with provenance graph, graph patterns can be used to represent
attack behaviors with rich semantics. Thus, pattern matching
is equal to threat detection. X. Shu et al. [56] points out
that a ideal pattern matching system should be able to treat
patterns as values and compose larger patterns based on others
to enable pattern reuse and abstraction. To accomplish such
targets, X. Shu et al. adopt well-designed query language and
typing system.
Stream-based Query. Threat detection is a time-critical
mission. To reduce the delay between the attack and the
investigation and response, P. Gao proposed SAQL [55], which
is able to take real-time event feed aggregated from multiple
hosts as input and provide rich interface. They built the
query engine on the top of Siddhi [59] to leverage its mature
stream management engine. To tackle the scalability challenge,
they designed a master-dependent-query scheme that identies
compatible queries and groups them to use a single copy.
Anomaly Analysis. Security log auditing and threat de-
tection rely heavily on expert experience. In order to adopt
domain knowledge from expert to express anomalies, P. Gao
provides a domain-specic query language, SAQL [55], which
allows analysts to express models for (1) rule-based anomalies,
(2) time-series anomalies, (3) invariant-based anomalies, and
(4) outlier-based anomalies.
All in all, the query systems provide analysts with a through-
put attack investigation capability. These systems typically
build on mature stream processing system or database, but
take provenance graphs’ special properties into consideration
with specifically-designed data model and query language.
IV. THREAT DETECTION MODULE
Using the traceability diagram, security analysts can link
causal events and entities in the host, so they have a good
abstraction ability, which can well describe the data flow and
control flow in the system. In order to connect multiple points
involved in an attack, the simplest method is to backtrack [22,
30]. However, the simple backtracking algorithm is difficult
to distinguish normal data flow from malicious control flow.
There is a problem of dependence on explosion, so the accu-
racy is very low. In order to solve this problem and provide
a real-time, efficient, and low false positive threat detection
system, researchers have proposed many different schemes.
In this chapter, we first give several threat models (3.1)
commonly used in threat detection research using traceability
7TABLE III
PROVENANCE GRAPH-BASED THREAT DETECTION SYSTEMS’ DESIGN
Approaches AttackModels Detection Models Data Management
Threat
Detection
Threat
Investigation
Response
Time Overhead TP FP
Back-tracking [58] General Naive Backtracking Cached Graph 7 3 Long Mid - High
HERCULE [60] General Community Detection Cached Graph 7 3 Long Low - High
POIROT [5] APT Graph Alignment Streaming Graph 3 3 Short Mid Mid Low
Log2vec [61] General Graph Embedding Cached Graph 3 7 Long Low Mid Mid
ProvDetector [62] General Graph Embedding Cached Graph 3 7 Long Low Mid Mid
UNICORN [46] APT Graph Sketch Cluster Streaming Graph 3 7 Mid Low High High
PrioTracker [63] APT Anomaly Scores Cached Graph 3 7 Mid Low Mid Mid
NoDoze [6] APT Anomaly Scores Vector-centric DB 3 7 Mid Low Mid Mid
P-gaussian [7] APT Anomaly Scores Vector-centric DB 3 7 Mid Mid Mid Mid
Pagoda [4] APT Anomaly Scores Vector-centric DB 3 7 Mid Low Mid Mid
Coloring [64] General Process Coloring Cached Graph 7 3 Long Low - High
SLEUTH [2] Leakage Tag Propagation Streaming Graph 3 7 Short Mid High High
HOLMES [3] APT Tag Propagation Streaming Graph 3 3 Short Low Mid Low
MORSE [65] APT Tag Propagation Cached graph 3 3 Long Mid Mid Mid
maps. Then we give a comparison of the existing intrusion
detection systems and try to answer two research questions.
RQ3: How to design an efficient and robust intrusion detection
algorithm and minimize false positives? RQ4: How to shorten
the response time of detection or traceability forensics as much
as possible? (3.2)
A. Attack Models
1) Multi-Stages APT Attack (APT) Model
A large part of threat detection using a provenance graph
aim at detecting advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks. APT
attacks have the characteristics of advancedness, complex-
ity, concealment, and persistence. Typical APT attacks can
be divided into multiple stages, as ATT&CK Metrics [66]
shows. Every stage has a particular target and a variety of
different technologies to achieve the target. Real-world attacks
usually involve three or more stages. Thus, even if missing
some stages, security analyzers can still identify a threat and
complete the missing piece with digital forensic techniques.
Meanwhile, analyzers can also adopt the multi-stages feature
to filter out false alerts.
2) Information Leakage (Leakage) Model
The information leakage model assumes that the attackers
are able to take control the entire target system. The goal is to
pass the specified sensitive information to endpoints controlled
by the attacker in various ways. A large part of APT attacks is
also aimed at information leakage. However, unlike the multi-
stage APT attack model, the information leakage model does
not focus on specific attack technologies, but focuses on the
information flow in the system, and continuously monitors
whether sensitive information flows to unauthorized points.
3) General Attack (General) Model
General attacks are much more diverse. There are low and
stealth attacks like APT but also quick and sound attacks such
as ransomware. The target could be stealing information but
also pure destruction. Thus, more general and detailed attack
models are required to detect such attacks.
B. Threat Detection and Investigation System Design
Provenance graphs are able to link events in system with
causality, regardless of the time between events, thus have
a overall view of entire attacks. Backtracking, proposed by
S.K.King [58], is the earliest and most fundamental attack
investigation method on provenance graph. Given a detection
point, backtracking is able to traverse the whole historical
context of system execution. However, naive backtracking
requires complete provenance graph and too much human
intervention, thus is neither timely nor efficient.
A ideal threat detection system needs to consider three
attributes of fast response, high efficiency and high accuracy at
the same time. However, the size of provenance graph, even
pruned, is very large. Therefore, threat detection on prove-
nance graphs could introduce high space and computing over-
head. In order to find a balance between the three attributes,
researchers have made many attempts. These approaches can
be divided into three categories according to the main detection
design.
Firstly, ”tag propagation-based approaches” [2], [5] try
to store system execution history incrementally in tag and
utilize tag propagation process to trace the causality. These
algorithms are roughly linear time complex. Moreover, they
can take streaming graph as input and response fast. Secondly,
”abnormal detection” [4], [6], [7], [63] try to identify abnormal
interaction between nodes. Thus, these approaches will model
normal behaviors by collecting historical data or data from
parallel systems. Finally, ”graph matching-based approaches”
[5], [46], [61] try to identify suspicious behavior by matching
sub-structure in graphs. However, graph matching is com-
putational complex. Researchers try to extract the graphs’
features with graph embedding or graph sketch algorithm or
use approximate methods.
As shown in Table IV-B, the target attack models, fun-
damental detection algorithms and data management model
affect each other and basically determine the design of the
detection system. We will compare the system properties
according to the ideal system properties introduced in §I-C.
1) Graph Matching-based Detection
The graph representation ensures the adversarially robust
of provenance graph-based detection approaches. The connec-
tions between nodes indicate the relationship between system
entities. Nodes close to each other are more likely to serve a
same function. Thus, utilizing community detection algorithm,
8analysts are able to correlate nodes in same attack scenarios.
Substructures in provenance graph can completely describe
the malicious behavior. Therefore, it is a very straightforward
idea to detect by graph matching. However, graph matching is
NP-complete problem [67]. Thus, researchers proposal many
approximate methods.
S. M. Milajerdi et al. proposed POIROT [5] and the
key online graph alignment algorithm. Utilizing query graph
manually extracted from threat intelligence and the graph
alignment algorithm, they could locate threats in provenance
graph quickly. However, extracting query graphs requires a
lot of manual work. Thus, it is difficult to cover all kind of
advanced attacks in various forms.
Graph embedding are widely used to extract graph feature
into vector whilst maximally preserving properties like graph
structure and information [68]–[70]. Utilizing the graph em-
bedding, research can effectively and efficiently detect threats
by separating malicious and benign log entries into different
clusters and identifying malicious ones [61], [62]. However,
such methods typical work on cached graph, so the response
is slower; meanwhile, it requires a lot of training data, so it is
not suitable for advanced attacks.
To tackle the above two challenges, Xueyuan Han et al.
proposed UNICORN [46], which adopt a historical graph
sketch approach to build an incrementally updatable, xed size,
longitudinal graph data structure. So, they can find threats
when the graph structure changed. However, this is a anomaly
detection-based approaches, thus suffer from the limitation of
anomaly detection.
2) Anomaly Score-based Detection
Anomaly score-based detection tried to quantify the suspi-
ciousness of each edge between node pairs. Using historical
statistics, researchers can find abnormal access in system.
Specifically, Pagoda [4] take in to account the anomaly degree
of both a single provenance path and the whole provenance
graph. Their subsequence work P-Gaussian [7] can detect
variants using gaussian distribution scheme. PrioTracker [63]
and NoDoze [6] adjust the events’ suspiciousness based on its
nighber’s suspiciousness.
Compared with graph-based anomaly detection, anomaly
score-based detection has much less parameters to tune, thus
much easier to implement and deploy. Meanwhile, anomaly
score-based detection typical adopting vector-centric relational
database, which is much faster than graph database.
3) Tag Propagation-based Detection
Tag propagation-based detection can be divided into two
phases, namely, tag initialization and tag propagation. In tag
initialization phase, tags are assigned to nodes. The amount of
nodes is much less than edges. Thus, storing and updating tags
is efficient. In tag propagation phase, tags are passed along
the edge according to the pre-designed rules. In this phase,
different tags could meet at a same node and triage further
calculation.
Process coloring proposed by X Jiang et al. [64], is a
simplified tag-based approach. In the tag initialization phase,
tags (colors) assigned to each remotely-accessible server or
process. Then, in the tag propagation phase, tags can be
inherited by spawned child processes or diffused indirectly
through process actions. As a result, analysts can quickly
identify the break-in point without tedious backtracking.
Follow-up works adopt more complex tag design to imple-
ment more functions. SLEUTH [2] utilize two types of tags,
namely, trustworthiness tags (t-tags) and condentiality tags (c-
tags), to implement a policy enforcement framework. In short,
an alarm is triggered when a node with low trustworthiness ac-
cesses a node with high confidentiality. Specifically, in the tag
initialization phase, t-tags and c-tags are assigned to the nodes
according to the predefined trustworthiness and confidentiality,
respectively. In the tag propagation phase, the trustworthiness
and confidentiality are propagated, and accessing that violate
the policy will be captured.
However, tag propagation-based approaches also suffer from
the ”dependency explosion” problem. Without extra control,
single tag can spread to everywhere and cause a lot of false-
positives. To tackle this challenge, S. M. Milajerdi et al.
proposed HOLMES [3], which raises detection threshold by
requiring the aggregation of more tags. In the tag initialization
phase, HOLMES assign less tags only to process with suspi-
cious behaviors. These suspicious behaviors contain lots of
false-positive. Thus, in the tag propagation phase, HOLMES
requires multiple tags to aggregate and reach pre-defined
threshold, and then triage the alert. Another way to avoid the
dependency explosion problem is to make the impact decrease
as the number of transmission rounds increases. MORSE
[65] achieve such target with tag decay and tag attenuation
techniques.
All in all, tag propagation-based approaches have following
advantages. Firstly, tag initialization and propagation processes
replace computationally expensive graph matching algorithm
and lower the overhead. Secondly, tag propagation-based ap-
proaches take one event at a time and update states corre-
spondingly, thus support streaming graph input naturally and
can response quickly. Last but not least, the information stored
in tags can be used to locate the point involved in the intrusion
quickly, and avoid the tedious backtracking algorithm.
V. RESEARCH CHALLENGES
In this section, we summarized the limitation of existing
works and proposed several research challenges for future
studies.
A. Empirical Parameter Setting
To distinguish malicious behaviours from benign ones,
provenance graph-based threat detection and investigation sys-
tems involve a lot of parameters, whose tuning affect the
accuracy and efficiency of systems significantly. However,
parameters are determined empirically. For example, Holmes
[3] adopt empirical numeric scores for each malicious behavior
and empirical alert threshold; NoDoze [6], etc. take empirical
decay factors. However, it isn’t easy to ensure that the param-
eters are suitable for all the scenarios since different systems’
behavior can be diverse. Even for the same host, the behavior
could be diverse at different times. A set of parameters tuned
for a host may not work well on another one.
9Thus, we need adaptive parameter adjustment mechanisms
for every different hosts. we can adopt new techniques such
as Few-Shot Learning or Zero-Shot Learning widely used in
areas such as knowledge engineering [71], [72].
B. Manual Signature Extraction
The accuracy of signature-based detection approaches heav-
ily rely on the signature extracted. However, signature extrac-
tion for provenance graph is non-trivial. On the one hand, both
academia and industry are lacking well-labelled real-world
attack graph data; on the other hand, extracting typical pattern
and corresponding semantic is laborious.
For example, Poirot [5] adopt manually extracted and pre-
processed query graphs for all different attacks. The extraction
process requires intensive labour. Nevertheless, the accuracy
is still not promised. If the query graphs are too detailed, they
may miss a variety of similar attacks. On the contrary, if the
query graphs lack details, there will be lots of false positive.
Such facts inspire us to find a more intelligence and auto-
matic signature extraction framework. Fortunately, more and
more security companies start to provide threat intelligence
with attack graphs. We may be able to adopt these data to
mine general attack patterns.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a system behavior abstraction tool, provenance graphs
are widely accepted for endpoint threat detection. In this
paper, we present the typical system architecture for prove-
nance graph-based threat detection. Then, we systematically
introduced and compared techniques choice involved and
concluded existing research challenges for future study.
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